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Unmanned aircraft will equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) 
system that enables them to comply with the requirement to "see 
and avoid" other aircraft, an important layer in the overall set of 
procedural, strategic and tactical separation methods designed to 
prevent mid-air collisions. Regulators will establish minimum 
operating standards for DAA effectiveness, but different 
combinations of algorithms, displays and procedures could be used 
to meet those standards. The research presented in this paper 
indicates the effectiveness of the combined pilot-DAA system as a 
function of the DAA design requirements and provides data that 
may be used to model the behavior of pilots when employing such 
systems. Two simulations involving 21 professional unmanned 
aircraft system (UAS) pilots evaluated eight different DAA system 
designs in order to assess their ability to maintain the "well clear" 
separation standard, i.e., the state of maintaining a safe distance 
from other aircraft that would not normally cause the initiation of a 
collision avoidance maneuver on either aircraft.   When the traffic 
display was integrated with the primary mission map directly in 
front of the pilot, there were fewer losses of well clear. Greater 
warning time provided to the pilot was strongly correlated with 
success in remaining well clear. Pilots' ability to separate from 
aircraft with cooperative and non-cooperative surveillance systems 
was nearly the same after accounting for the amount of alert time 
provided in each encounter, although the limited surveillance 
volume for the airborne-equipped aircraft meant alerts tended to 
occur later and therefore were more difficult to resolve.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Regulations to establish operational and performance 
requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being 
developed by a consortium of government, industry and 
academic institutions [1]. Those requirements will apply to the 
new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment 
necessary to integrate UAS with the United States’ (U.S) 
National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined 
according to their contribution to the overall safety case. That 
safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS 
operating in the NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). 
Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment 
requirements to an airspace safety case.  Foremost among these 
is calculation of the system’s “risk ratio”—the degree to which 
a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation 
standard [2]. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination 
with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will 
determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms 
of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known 
what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or 
even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the 
pilot’s ability to maintain separation. The relationship between 
the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the 
DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, 
must be determined before DAA operational and performance 
requirements can be finalized. 
Much research across the globe has been devoted to 
integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace [3], [4], [5], [6]. 
Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA 
system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation and 
flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of 
development programs to produce a deployable system, so it is 
unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to 
general requirements for future traffic displays [7]. Other 
displays have undergone testing to collect data that may 
generalize to new displays, but have not been evaluated in the 
context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS 
equipped with DAA systems in the NAS [8].  Other research 
efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation 
standards.  Together with this work, they are expected to 
facilitate validation of the airspace safety case [9][10]. 
The contribution of the present work is to quantify the 
effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well 
clear as a function of display and algorithm features. This 
quantification will allow selection of a minimum set of DAA 
design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be 
unique for all UAS platforms. A second objective is to collect 
and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the 
modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-
in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in 
such batch experiments will allow investigation of a much 
larger number of encounters than is possible in human 
simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a 
particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all 
foreseeable operational conditions.  Moreover, results related to 
the performance of the pilots’ use of displays and the time they 
required to carry out different aspects of this task may be found 
in a companion paper [11]. 
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This paper will provide some background about well clear 
for UAS DAA systems. It will then describe the methodology 
used in two human-in-the-loop simulations to evaluate eight 
different display variants with a variety of separation 
algorithms. Next, it presents the experiment results and 
concludes with a summary. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The self-separation (SS) function of a DAA system is a 
means of compliance with the regulatory requirements (14CFR 
Part 91, §91.111 and §91.113) to “see and avoid” and to remain 
well clear of other aircraft. The concept of well clear has been 
proposed as an airborne separation standard to which a DAA 
system must adhere, and performing SS correctly means 
remaining well clear of other aircraft [12]. In order to build a 
DAA system that helps the pilot remain well clear, a 
quantitative definition of well clear must be defined. 
Well clear is defined as the state of maintaining a safe 
distance from other aircraft that would not normally cause the 
initiation of a collision avoidance (CA) maneuver by either 
aircraft [2]. A well clear separation standard should be large 
enough to (1) avoid corrective maneuvers by intruders (i.e., any 
aircraft detected in range of the UAS’s surveillance system) 
that are equipped with a CA system (e.g., Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)—or Airborne Collision 
Avoidance System (ACAS)), (2) minimize traffic alert 
issuances by air traffic control (ATC), and (3) avoid excessive 
concern for pilots of proximate piloted aircraft. However, a 
well clear separation standard also should be small enough to 
prevent the need for large deviations that potentially disrupt 
traffic flow and ATC separation management plans.  
A distance-based separation minima proposed by 
EUROCONTROL was considered [13]; however, the lack of a 
time separation criterion creates interoperability issues with 
when an intruder’s collision avoidance system would activate.  
The definition of well clear used here predates the work 
performed in U.S. by the UAS Sense and Avoid Science and 
Research Panel [14], whose charter was to derive a DAA well 
clear separation standard.  However, the two approaches share 
a similar heritage.  The separation standard for well clear used 
here is based on logic that predicts the closest point of 
approach (CPA) between the UAS and other aircraft, and 
thresholds were selected to be conceptually outside the range at 
which TCAS will trigger a resolution advisory. For this study, 
a loss of well clear is defined to occur when the predicted CPA 
horizontal separation is less than 0.8 nmi, CPA altitude 
separation is less than 400 feet, and time-to-CPA is less than 40 
seconds. The closest point of approach between two aircraft is 
an estimate of the future minimum slant range. Time-to-CPA is 
defined as the difference between the time at predicted CPA 
and current time.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
This research consisted of two experiments involving 
professional UAS pilots situated at a UAS ground-control 
station (GCS). The objective of the first experiment 
(Experiment 1) was to evaluate candidate DAA displays and 
algorithms for their effectiveness in helping pilots remain well 
clear of all traffic. More specifically, Experiment 1 investigated 
(1) the appropriate alerting thresholds for self-separation, i.e., 
remaining well clear, (2) minimum information requirements 
for DAA displays, and (3) advanced display features that could 
potentially improve accuracy and expediency in pilot’s 
determining, negotiating, and executing maneuvers to maintain 
well clear. A follow-on experiment (Experiment 2) leveraged 
lessons learned from Experiment 1 to continue the evaluation 
of candidate displays and algorithms with respect to a pilot’s 
ability to remain well clear. Furthermore, communication 
latencies and limitations in surveillance detection range and 
field of regard were modeled to increase the fidelity of the 
overall DAA system. 
A. Participants 
A total of 21 pilot participants participated in these two 
studies. Participants were required to hold, at a minimum, an 
Instrument Rating or pilot certification through the military. 
The pilots were either members of the California Air National 
Guard (163rd Reconnaissance Squadron) or Beale Air Force 
Base, and all had experience flying the Global Hawk (RQ-4) or 
Reaper (MQ-9). Two retired air traffic controllers with 
experience at the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center 
(ZOA) and three pseudo-pilot confederates also participated in 
these studies. 
B. Simulation Environment 
The UAS pilot participants were positioned at a UAS GCS, 
either the Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) [15] (see 
Figure 1(a)) provided by the Air Force Research Laboratory, or 
the NASA-developed Cockpit Situation Display (CSD) (see 
Figure 1(b)). The Multi-Aircraft Control Station (MACS) [16] 
provided the ATC environment with pseudo-pilot stations for 
controlling simulated “manned” aircraft traffic within the 
airspace. 
The CSD is an interactive 3D volumetric display designed 
to provide pilots with awareness of their surroundings [17]. In 
Experiment 1, it was used to display traffic, trajectory 
information, and loss-of-well-clear alerts, and it provided tools 
to aid the pilot in selecting maneuvers to prevent losses of well 
clear when necessary. The CSD served as a “standalone” 
display with relevant DAA information located next to the 
pilot’s primary command and control display, the VSCS. When 
co-located with the VSCS, the CSD was displayed in the 
bottom-left monitor in Figure 1(a). The CSD was not used in 
Experiment 2 for reasons explained in Section III.C.  
The VSCS’s primary monitor contains a Tactical Situation 
Display (TSD, shown at the bottom-center of Figure 1(a)), 
which displayed the UAS ownship and mission route over a 
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Figure 1: (a) Vigilant Spirit Control Station, (b) Cockpit Situation Display 
  
moving map. All commands performed by the pilot 
participants were executed using editing and navigation 
windows within the TSD. A second monitor displayed VSCS’s 
simulated out-the-window nose-camera view (top-center of 
Figure 1(a)). This “soda straw” nose-camera view provided 
pilots with accurate terrain information and an integrated head-
up display that contained current airspeed, altitude and heading 
information.  
MACS is a simulation platform that instantiates small- or 
large-scale airspace environments. MACS also models the 
participation of other flights by simulating flight paths of 
individual aircraft based on their source and destination 
airports, flight plan, flight rules, and confederate pilot 
interactions. For these experiments, MACS was configured to 
provide confederate pilots an interface to control multiple 
aircraft as well as an emulation of the display system 
replacement (DSR) for the confederate air traffic controller.   
For these simulations, sectors 40 and 41 from Oakland Air 
Route Traffic Control Center were used. The UAS pilots 
commanded a simulated unmanned aircraft with characteristics 
similar to a Predator-B. Realistic current-day traffic levels and 
flows were simulated within sectors 40 and 41. 
C. Experiment Design 
In Experiment 1, a mixed factorial, repeated measure 
design was used to study pilot response times, number of losses 
of well clear, separation at closest point of approach, and other 
DAA measures. A 2x2x2 experiment design matrix was used 
(see Table 1) involving three independent variables: display 
configuration, level of traffic information and resolution tools, 
and lead time for self-separation alerts.  
The standalone display configurations provided traffic 
information via the CSD but required the pilot to command and 
control from the “separate” VSCS display. Conversely, the 
integrated display configurations provided traffic information 
within the VSCS itself; i.e., all information and controls were 
integrated into a single display.  
The basic (minimum) traffic information configuration 
included a basic set of traffic information to aid the pilot in 
remaining well clear: intruder’s location, ground speed, relative 
altitude, vertical velocity indicator, heading, flight identifier 
(ID), range, and bearing. The advanced information 
configuration included all the basic elements, augmented with 
alerting indications on traffic that may cause a loss of well 
clear, graphical depiction of CPA location, time-to-CPA, a trial 
planner tool, and maneuver recommendations to resolve 
predicted losses of well clear.  
The two self-separation alerting thresholds governed the 
self-separation alert lead time, the lead time an alert provides to 
a pilot in which to act to remain well clear. Like well clear, the 
alert lead time was based on time-to-CPA. It is important the 
alerting time of a DAA system be acceptable to air traffic 
controllers. The larger value, 110 seconds prior to CPA, was 
based on playing back short traffic scenarios through MACS 
and having ATC participants assess when they would provide 
traffic advisories (TAs) for various encounters. The results 
revealed, on average, that ATC gave TAs at 110 seconds time-
to-CPA. The smaller value, 80 seconds prior to CPA, was 
selected to study the effectiveness of pilots to remain well clear 
with relatively less alerting time. 
As a follow-on to Experiment 1, four additional displays 
were evaluated in Experiment 2, for a total of eight display 
concepts. Since the integrated display configurations were 
more effective in aiding the pilot to remain well clear than the 
standalone display conditions, the focus in Experiment 2 was to 
evaluate differences between specific advanced display 
features from Experiment 1 using only the integrated display 
(i.e., the VSCS).  As for Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also used 
a one-way repeated-measures factorial design to collect data on 
pilot measured response, number of losses of well clear, 
separation at closest point of approach (CPA), and other DAA 
measures. Four display configurations were used to create a 
simple four-cell experiment. All test configurations used the 
integrated display concept (dropped standalone) from 
Experiment 1, where traffic display information was co-located 
within the GCS. Display 1 augmented the “Basic Integrated” 
display configuration from Experiment 1 with (1) alerting 
indications on targets that may cause a loss of well clear and 
(2) graphical depiction of CPA location. This display was 
considered the baseline in Experiment 2.  The second display 
configuration (Display 2) refined Display configuration 1 by 
introducing a trial planner tool, which allowed the pilot to use 
the display to interactively search for heading and altitude 
changes that are clear of all traffic when a predicted loss of 
well clear is presented. The third display configuration 
(Display 3) added to the basic information-only display an 
indication of a recommended maneuver from Autoresolver-AD 
(see Autoresolver Adaptor section of [18]) that a pilot could 
easily execute when a predicted loss of well clear is alerted. 
The final display configuration (Display 4) added to the basic 
information-only display the union of Displays 3 and 4.  Also, 
a single self-separation alerting threshold of 110 seconds prior 
to CPA was employed; hence it was not an independent 
variable. 
Every pilot participant was involved in four trials using 
each display configuration once. The order of display 
configurations for each pilot participant was counter-balanced. 
Also, for this experiment an embedded variable was added to 
simulate cooperative- and non-cooperative sensor performance. 
Details on how cooperative and non-cooperative were modeled 
are described in Section III.D. This embedded surveillance 
variable was not counter-balanced. Each pilot for each display 
configuration experienced scripted traffic encounters; 
approximately two-thirds of the encounters were detected using 
simulated non-cooperative sensors (i.e., no electronic means of 
identifying aircraft and exchanging state information) aboard 
the UAS, and one-third were detected using the simulated 
cooperative sensor (i.e., electronic means of identifying aircraft 
and exchanging of state information).  This variable was not 
part of the experimental design, because the intent was to 
evaluate differences between the encounter types across the 
four display conditions in Experiment 2. 
Table 1: Experiment 1 - Experiment Design Matrix 
Traffic 
Information 
Display 
Configuration 
Self-separation 
Alerting Time (s) 
Basic Standalone 80 
Advanced Integrated 110 
D. Detect-and-avoid System 
The DAA system was simulated using a software 
architecture called JADEM (Java Architecture for DAA 
Modeling and Extensibility) [18] that models various 
components of DAA systems, including the detect, track, 
evaluate, prioritize, declare, determine, and command 
functions. The modeling of these functions is described briefly 
below. 
The detect and track function—or surveillance system— 
adapted for these simulations used spatial filtering that only 
displayed traffic within a range of 80 nmi of the cooperative 
sensor. This 80-nmi range is much larger than Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) specifications; 
however, in order to nullify the potential effect of undetected 
cooperative traffic precisely at the self-separation alert ranges, 
a broader, notional range for a cooperative sensor was 
employed. A non-cooperative sensor—a state-of-the-art 
airborne radar—was simulated using a similar procedure; 
however, only traffic within six nmi range, +/- 110 degrees 
azimuth off the current heading of the UAS, and +/- 20 degrees 
elevation between the center mass of the UAS were depicted 
on the display. State estimation was “perfect” for all traffic; 
thus, no tracking algorithm was employed.  
The evaluate, prioritize, and declare functions are 
responsible for evaluating each intruder detected by the 
surveillance system and determine its threat alerting level. To 
determine if a threat is predicted between a UAS and a given 
intruder, a reference trajectory is synthesized from the UAS’s 
known intent. A reference trajectory is also built for every 
intruder and modeled as a “dead-reckoned” extrapolation of the 
most recent intruder state (position and velocity). Time-
synchronized progression along discretized projected states 
along the ownship’s and intruder’s trajectories are used to find 
the predicted CPA—the minimum slant range along the 
trajectories. The threats are classified using the predicted CPA, 
and they are prioritized based on their separation and urgency. 
The separation criteria, alerting time, and alert color-scheme 
are illustrated in Figure 1. The five alerting levels used in these 
simulations are as follows: 
• Collision avoidance (CA) alert (red targets in 
Figure 2): The basis of this alert is to indicate to the 
pilot that s/he has lost well clear with another aircraft, 
and immediate action is required. Thus, the criteria for 
this alert are the same as the standard for well clear: 
predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 0.8 
nmi, CPA altitude separation is less than 400 feet, and 
time-to-CPA is less than 40 seconds. Pilot action: 
Immediate action is required to regain well clear; 
notify ATC as soon as practicable after taking action. 
• Self-separation (SS) alert (yellow targets with red 
outline in Figure 2): This alert is similar to the CA 
alert above. It uses the same spatial separation; 
however, additional alert time is provided to give 
ample time for the pilot to take action. This alert level 
is the primary indication to the pilot that action is 
necessary to remain well clear. Much of the pilot’s 
effectiveness in maintaining well clear will be 
evaluated as a function of the lead time with which the 
pilot was first presented a self-separation alert. The 
criteria for a self-separation alert are as follows: 
predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 0.8 
nmi, CPA altitude separation is less than 400 feet, and 
time-to-CPA is less than 80 or 110 seconds, depending 
on the test case. Pilot action: Action to remain well 
clear will be necessary if the encounter does not 
change; coordinate with ATC to determine an 
appropriate maneuver, if there is sufficient time to 
remain well clear. 
• Self-separation “buffered” alert (yellow targets 
with black outline in Figure 2): This alert includes a 
spatial buffer to the SS alert criteria. Predicted CPA 
horizontal separation is less than 1.2 nmi, CPA altitude 
separation is less than 900 feet, and time-to-CPA is 
less than 80 or 110 seconds. Pilot action: Action to 
remain well clear will be necessary only if intruder 
suddenly makes a horizontal or vertical maneuver. 
• Preventive alert (white targets in Figure 2): 
Predicted CPA horizontal separation is less than 2.0 
nmi, CPA altitude separation is less than 900 feet, and 
time-to-CPA is less than 80 or 110 seconds. Pilot 
action: No action necessary to avoid this aircraft, but 
its presence should be considered when determining a 
resolution maneuver to avoid other aircraft. 
• “No” alert (gray targets in Figure 2): Intruder is 
within surveillance detection range but does not satisfy 
the criteria for any of the above alert levels. 
The determine function is the process by which the pilot 
determines a maneuver to resolve an alerted threat. If the pilot 
receives a SS alert, the concept is for the pilot to use the 
display and algorithms to select a maneuver, coordinate with 
ATC, and execute it prior to losing well clear. A conflict 
resolution algorithm, called GRACE [18], was used to simulate 
the collision avoidance function. Upon receiving a CA alert, 
GRACE computes a hypothesized “best” maneuver—a 
horizontal vector or altitude change—to execute in order to 
regain well clear. The maneuver is depicted on the display to 
trigger pilot action. In the case of a SS alert, depending on the 
display configuration, the pilot may use (a) his own judgment 
(basic condition), (b) a trial planner (advanced condition), or 
(c) Autoresolver-AD maneuver recommendations (advanced 
condition) to avoid losing well clear. Autoresolver-AD is 
adapted from the Autoresolver algorithm for conventional air 
traffic to enable UAS to remain well clear within the detect-
and-avoid domain [19]. Key adaptations for DAA applications 
include contending with shorter look-ahead times, lack of 
trajectory intent information for intruder aircraft, smaller 
spatial separation standards, introduction of temporal 
separation requirements in addition to spatial, more frequent 
update rates, and single “ownship” point-of-view vs. 
centralized separation management of multiple aircraft.
E. Procedures 
Pilot participants began with extensive training on the basic 
functionality of VSCS. Prior to each experiment trial, 
participants were trained on the distinct aspects of the display 
configuration for that trial and then completed a 20-minute 
practice scenario. Participants completed four experiment trials 
from the set of experiment configurations described in Section 
III.C. Experiment trials were approximately 38 minutes long. 
After each trial, participants completed a post-trial subjective 
questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, participants 
completed a post-simulation questionnaire. 
During each trial, the pilot was responsible for flying a pre-
filed mission route. The UAS mission was prescribed under 
Instrument Flight Rules, so the pilot was required to comply 
with ATC clearances. Furthermore, the pilot was responsible 
for monitoring traffic display alerts to maintain safety of flight. 
When a CA alert was presented, the pilot was required to 
expeditiously execute the prescribed collision avoidance 
maneuver presented on the display and notify ATC of their 
divergence from their clearance. Data for reaction times and 
maneuver types for collision avoidance were not recorded, as 
this information was not pertinent to the experiment objectives; 
these tasks were required only to add realism to the 
environment. The focus of the experiment was on the 
information and actions prior to losing well clear.  
When a SS alert was presented, it was the pilot’s discretion 
to determine if/when a maneuver was necessary. If a maneuver 
was necessary the pilot was responsible for requesting a 
clearance from ATC based on their desired maneuver as time 
permitted in order to remain well clear. When uploading a 
resolution maneuver, the pilot modified a downstream 
waypoint on its route, or commanded a heading, altitude, 
and/or indicated airspeed through the UAS’s autopilot system. 
Also, in order to present the pilot with a realistic workload, 
besides using the traffic display and information the pilot was 
also required to monitor and respond to system health status 
tasks and chat sessions.  These chat sessions would require the 
UAS pilots to engage dispatch to communicate information 
such as mission radio frequency changes, radial and distance 
checks, and fuel level remaining requests, however were 
secondary to complying with ATC clearances and maintaining 
safety of flight.  The pilot operated the UAS during the 
mission’s enroute portion only; no takeoff or landing was 
included in these simulations. 
F. Scenarios 
Pilots flew two different mission routes embedded within 
four trial conditions. The missions were based on realistic 
current-day routes allowed under special conditions (Certificate 
of Authorization or Waiver) in ZOA sectors 40 and 41. The 
first mission was a fire-monitoring mission, and the second was 
a coastal watch pattern. The traffic patterns and density were 
developed alongside an ATC subject matter expert and 
designed to represent a busy, current day in the chosen 
airspace. 
Within each trial, approximately eight traffic encounters 
causing SS alerts were designed into the scenarios. The 
encounters’ characteristics were designed using a combination 
of encounter angles (e.g., head-on, crossing, or overtaking), 
relative velocities (0 or 20 knots), and relative vertical 
trajectories (level-level or level-transitioning). Confederate 
controllers facilitated the scripted encounters by issuing 
encounter-inducing clearances to specific pre-planned 
surrounding aircraft. 
IV. RESULTS 
Results are presented for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in 
terms of the primary metrics: the proportion of encounters that 
resulted in loss of well clear and the timing associated with 
these encounters.   
A. Loss of Well Clear Proportions in Experiment 1 
The most important metric related to the safety of the 
combined pilot-DAA system is the proportion of encounters for 
which it fails to maintain the well clear separation standard, 
referred to here as a loss of well clear (LoWC). This proportion 
depends on the lead time before the LoWC at which the alert is 
first issued, because, if the lead time is too short, there will not 
be adequate time for the pilot to determine a resolution 
maneuver, enter and upload it to the aircraft, and allow the 
aircraft to change its trajectory sufficiently to avoid a LoWC. If 
 
Figure 2: Detect-and-avoid alerting levels and criteria. 
a large amount of warning time is provided to the pilot, it is 
expected that the LoWC proportion would become insensitive 
to that parameter, because other factors, such as late-
maneuvering intruders and air traffic constraints, would 
overwhelm the additional benefit of a few extra seconds of 
warning.  
A histogram of the number of encounters experienced by 
the pilot participants as a function of the self-separation alert 
initial warning time is shown in Figure 3. This chart also shows 
the outcomes of those encounters: the number of encounters for 
which the pilot-DAA system prevented a loss of well clear with 
the intruder is shown in green for each time-to-CPA bin, while 
the number of encounters that resulted in a LoWC is shown in 
red. The left-most bin represents those encounters that were 
first alerted with less than 40 seconds to CPA, which 
corresponds to the LoWC threshold. So, all of those encounters 
were “popup” LoWCs, because the pilot was not alerted until 
well clear had been lost. The next bin represents encounters 
between 40 and 55 seconds time-to-CPA, which means the 
pilot had less than 20 seconds of warning before a LoWC 
occurred, and all but two of the 18 encounters resulted in 
LoWCs. The three bins on the right represent encounters with 
warning times between 55 and 110 seconds before predicted 
LoWC. Figure 4 presents the same data as a ratio of “red to 
green” for each time-to-CPA bin. The figure indicates that 
warnings less than 15 seconds prior to losing well clear nearly 
always resulted in a LoWC and warning times much greater 
than this number did not significantly (p>0.05) reduce the 
proportion of LoWC. Furthermore, the number of LoWCs did 
not significantly (p>0.05) decrease as a function of the number 
of trials performed by a test subject, suggesting that learning 
effects were negligible.  
The proportion of encounters that became LoWCs was 
also calculated as a function of the display configuration. 
Additional display elements may help the pilot avoid LoWCs 
if they provide appropriate information in a logical manner for 
the task, but they may also take more time to use or distract 
the pilot and increase the LoWC rate. For this analysis, 
“popup” LoWCs were filtered out, because they give little 
indication as to how effective the displays were at aiding the 
pilot to remain well clear. The overall proportion of LoWCs 
by display condition is shown in Figure 5.      
Twenty percent fewer LoWCs were produced when pilots 
used the integrated display as compared to the standalone 
display, and 45% fewer LoWCs were produced when pilots 
used the advanced display as compared to the basic display. 
Although these differences are large, they are not statistically 
significant (p>0.05) because of the large variability in the 
number of LoWCs from scenario to scenario. The two basic 
displays performed poorly, with nearly twice the rate of 
LoWCs as any of their advanced display counterparts. The 
LoWC rate metric appears to be helpful in ruling out the use of 
a basic display, but it cannot differentiate between the other 
display types, because none of the differences are statistically  
(p>0.05). Additional safety and efficiency metrics are 
necessary to determine minimum requirements for a DAA 
algorithm and display system. 
B. Maneuver Timing Results in Experiment 1 
The final metrics related to the use and effectiveness of a 
DAA system are the amount of time required by the pilot from 
the first alert to upload of a resolution maneuver: i.e., pilot 
response time and the time-to-CPA at which maneuvers are 
uploaded to the aircraft. Each of these metrics can be further 
categorized by whether the pilot obtained an ATC clearance 
before s/he uploaded the maneuver, the standard procedure, or 
if they uploaded the maneuver without an amended clearance, a 
permissible but not preferable course of action. These metrics 
are important from a safety standpoint, because maneuvers 
executed without an ATC clearance can interfere with an air 
traffic controller’s plan for the traffic in their sector and 
contribute to secondary conflicts. Additional LoWCs can occur 
when longer times are required to determine and execute 
maneuvers and those maneuvers are executed more closely to 
the well clear boundary. In contrast to the previous section, all 
encounters in this section represent successful maneuvers for 
remaining well clear. 
 
Figure 3: Outcome of encounters (actual losses of well clear vs. those that 
were prevented) by time to closest point of approach at which SST alert was 
first provided. 
 
 Figure 4: Proportion of encounters that became losses of well clear by 
time to closest point of approach at which SS alert was first provided. 
 The time difference between the first SS alert and the first 
upload of a resolution maneuver is referred to here as pilot 
response time. As expected, ATC clearances were obtained 
under most circumstances, and the greater the time between the 
alert and upload, the greater the likelihood that an amended 
clearance was received. This suggests that additional time spent 
by the pilot in determining a course of action was rewarded by 
an improved approval rate from ATC. Figure 6 shows the mean 
response time (in terms of time-to-CPA) grouped by whether 
or not the pilot obtained an ATC clearance. In all time-to-CPA 
bins, mean response time is larger when obtaining a clearance, 
and—contradictory to the procedures for this experiment—
there are instances where the pilot obtained a clearance from 
ATC prior to maneuvering when time-to-CPA was less than 40 
seconds (i.e., well clear was already lost). As summarized in 
Table 2, median response times were significantly (p<0.05) 
shorter when an amended clearance was not obtained: 16 
seconds without a clearance versus 27 seconds with a 
clearance. This difference illustrates that pilots were more 
likely to act without obtaining an ATC clearance when alerts 
occurred nearer to the well clear boundary. 
The response-time values help to explain the results 
presented previously that showed a low probability of resolving 
a potential LoWC when the alert time is less than 20 seconds. 
Because it typically takes a pilot 16 seconds to determine and 
upload a resolution maneuver even without an ATC clearance, 
20 seconds of warning leaves only a few seconds for the 
aircraft to maneuver to maintain well clear. This is rarely 
sufficient. The median response time with an ATC clearance of 
27 seconds suggests that a reasonable nominal alert time before 
a LoWC should be at least 40 seconds in order to provide a 
buffer for more difficult encounter cases, and perhaps 
considerably more than this if intruders can be reliably 
identified at that horizon. Although somewhat counter- 
intuitive, the mean maneuver execution time is nearly identical 
for the two cases at 51.7 and 53.9 seconds (see Table 2) and the 
distributions are similar. This result suggests that pilots prefer 
to obtain clearances following the standard procedure, but that 
they will work to ensure they resolve a potential violation at a 
time appropriate for the given encounter, whether or not they 
have obtained a clearance. 
C. Losses of Well Clear Proportions in Experiment 2 
The second pilot-in-the-loop simulation split the integrated 
display into four different variants of available tools. This 
display condition was the most promising system tested during 
Experiment 1, so it was natural to investigate which of the tools 
in that condition was most effective in reducing LoWC rates 
and LoWC durations when they did occur. 
Experiment 2 incorporated both cooperative and non-
cooperative aircraft, so the number of LoWCs as a fraction of 
the overall encounters by time of first self-separation alert can 
be classified by the type of aircraft encountered as well. Figure 
7 shows the outcomes of encounters with cooperative aircraft 
by time-to-CPA at which the intruder was first predicted to 
become a LoWC, while Figure 8 shows the same data for non-
cooperative aircraft encounters. The distribution of time-to-
CPA of alerts for non-cooperative aircraft is smaller (median = 
64.5 seconds), because the limited surveillance range reduces 
the time at which an alert can first be detected. The distribution 
of time-to-CPA for cooperative aircraft is around 110 seconds, 
because most of the time the surveillance system already 
detected and tracked the aircraft prior to the 110-second 
threshold. Both figures illustrate decreases in proportion of 
LoWCs as the time-to-CPA of the self-separation alert 
increases. Only two LoWCs occurred with cooperative aircraft 
when the alert time was greater than 20 seconds to LoWC 
(time-to-CPA greater than 60 seconds), and only three LoWCs 
occurred with the non-cooperative aircraft. When excluding 
“popup” LoWCs, pilots were able to prevent LoWCs in 76% of 
the encounters with non-cooperative aircraft when alerted 20 
seconds or less prior to losing well clear, and in 96% of the 
encounters with non-cooperative aircraft when alerted more 
than 20 seconds prior to losing well clear. For encounters with 
cooperative aircraft, the pilots were able to prevent 50% of 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of encounters that became losses of well clear by display 
condition in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 6: Mean response time by time-to-CPA at which the first SS alert was 
provided, classified by whether or not the pilot obtained an ATC clearance 
before maneuvering in Experiment 1. 
Table 2: Pilot response time and maneuver execution time statistics 
in Experiment 1. Only encounters in which the pilot successfully 
prevented LoWCs are included. 
Statistics in seconds 
Pilot Acted 
Without ATC 
Clearance 
Pilot Obtained 
ATC 
Clearance 
Median Response Time 16 27 
Mean Response Time 20.8 31.2 
Std. Dev. of Response 
Time 13.9 17.9 
Time-to-CPA at 
Execution 51.7 53.9 
predicted LoWCs when alerted 20 seconds or less prior to 
losing well clear, and 93% of predicted LoWCs when alerted 
with more than 20 seconds. Although one would hope that no 
LoWCs occur regardless of the time of first alert, the self-
separation system tested here is designed to deal with only 
those more strategic encounters that begin well outside the 
violation regime. A separate collision avoidance function 
would be employed to resolve self-separation alerts that occur 
less than 20 seconds prior to LoWC. 
The proportion of all encounters that became losses of well 
clear by display condition is presented in Figure 9. It is still 
unclear which advanced display feature from Experiment 1 
affected the reduction in LoWCs, however, the proportion of 
LoWCs was slightly less with the addition of maneuver 
recommendations (Display 3), and the proportion of LoWCs 
was approximately 50% less with the addition of recommended 
maneuvers and a trial planning tool together (Display 4) as 
compared to the “Information Only” display (Display 1). 
However, none of the performance differences between 
displays was statistically significant (p>0.05). 
D. Maneuver Timing Results in Experiment 2 
Various statistics associated with pilot response time are 
presented in Table 3. The metrics are classified based upon 
whether or not the pilot obtained an ATC clearance prior to 
maneuvering, and then by (a) all encounter types, i.e., 
cooperative and non-cooperative  (overall), (b) encounters 
with cooperative aircraft, and (c) non-cooperative aircraft. 
Overall, mean pilot response time was significantly (p<0.05) 
shorter when pilots maneuvered without obtaining an ATC 
clearance (mean = 10.8 seconds) as compared to when they 
did obtain an ATC clearance (mean = 18.7 seconds). This 
result held for encounters with cooperative aircraft and with 
non-cooperative aircraft. Moreover, pilot response times were 
shorter for encounters with cooperative aircraft in Experiment 
2 than in Experiment 1. An analysis of variance of pilot 
response times between experiments found the improvement 
to be statistically significant (p<0.05). The shorter response 
times in Experiment 2 may have been facilitated by pilots’ 
opportunity to focus on the integrated display, which appears 
to be the most effective display. Also, because pilots in 
Experiment 2 needed only to train on the VSCS and not the 
CSD, their experiment days were shorter, possibly 
contributing to reduced pilot fatigue and better performance. 
Thirdly, improved training materials regarding procedures and 
methodologies for remaining well clear may have contributed 
to better performance. The largest pilot response time was for 
encounters with cooperative aircraft when pilots obtained an 
ATC clearance (mean = 24.7 seconds), which is intuitive as 
the superior surveillance information available from 
cooperative aircraft affords longer alert lead times, making it 
allowable for pilots to take more time in determining a 
maneuver to prevent LoWCs and obtaining an ATC clearance 
before executing. 
The main metric in Table 4 is time-to-CPA when the pilot 
executes a maneuver to remain well clear. Counter to intuition, 
the mean times-to-CPA at execution for encounters with 
cooperative aircraft are approximately the same, regardless of 
whether the pilot did or did not take the time to obtain an ATC 
clearance (76.8 and 77.7 seconds, respectively). This is 
interesting because, as described earlier, pilot response time 
was significantly less when the pilot acted without an ATC 
clearance; so, one might have expected the same trend with 
time-to-CPA at execution.  
The clarifying result is with time-to-CPA at first alert in 
Table 4. For these same scenarios, it shows that for encounters 
with cooperative aircraft, longer warning lead times (mean 
102.0 seconds time-to-CPA) correlated with cases in which 
pilots did obtain an ATC clearance; the shorter warning lead 
times (90.9 seconds time-to-CPA) correlated with cases in 
which pilots acted without obtaining a clearance. This 
 
Figure 7: Outcome of encounters with cooperative aircraft (actual losses of 
well clear vs. those that were prevented) by time to closest point of approach 
at which SS alert was first provided. 
 
Figure 8: Outcome of encounters with non-cooperative aircraft (actual losses 
of well clear vs. those that were prevented) by time to closest point of 
approach at which SS alert was first provided. 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of encounters that became losses of well clear by 
display in Experiment 2. 
Table 3: Pilot response time statistics from Experiment 2. Only encounters in which the pilot successfully prevented LoWCs are included. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Time-to-CPA at First Alert and Execution from Experiment 2. Only encounters in which the pilot successfully prevented LoWCs are included. 
Units: 
sec. 
Cooperative Targets Non-cooperative Targets 
Pilot Acted Without ATC 
Clearance (n=23) 
Pilot Obtained ATC 
Clearance (n=27) 
Pilot Acted Without ATC 
Clearance (n=62) 
Pilot Obtained ATC 
Clearance (n=60) 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Time-to-
CPA at 
First Alert 
Time-to-
CPA at 
Execution 
Median 108 94 109 79 74 65 66 52 
Mean 90.9 77.7 102.0 76.8 76.6 66.2 76.4 56.5 
Std. Dev. 31.5 31.8 18.6 20.6 18.2 18.9 20.9 20.6 
suggests that pilots’ decision-making processes are influenced 
by the alert lead time. Furthermore, the target time that these 
pilots wanted in order to maneuver their UAS against 
cooperative aircraft was approximately 77 seconds time-to-
CPA—or about 37 seconds prior to losing well clear—
regardless of whether or not the pilot requested and obtained an 
ATC clearance.  
Lastly, a statistically significant difference was observed 
in the time-to-CPA at the time of maneuver execution for 
encounters with non-cooperative aircraft between pilots 
obtaining an ATC clearance (mean = 56.5 seconds) and pilots 
not obtaining a clearance (mean = 66.2 seconds). The 
difference here stems from the pilot response time distribution 
for encounters with non-cooperative aircraft, since the alerting 
times were about the same whether or not an ATC clearance 
was obtained. Figure 10 shows mean response time by time-to-
CPA, classified by whether the pilot obtained an ATC 
clearance before maneuvering. As expected, response time is 
always larger in cases when the pilot obtains an ATC clearance 
prior to maneuvering except for when time-to-CPA is 40 
seconds or less, because in those cases the pilot almost always 
acts without a clearance. The largest difference in response 
time between the cases in which the pilot does and does not 
obtain an ATC clearance was for times-to-CPA between 70-80 
seconds, and the smallest difference was for times-to-CPA 
between 60-70  
Regarding the displays’ effectiveness at enhancing pilot 
response times (not illustrated here in a figure), Display 3 and 4 
were correlated with shorter response times by approximately 
five seconds when compared to Display 1 and 2. Displaying a 
maneuver recommendation to the pilot may expedite his action 
and enhance his ability to remain well clear; however, no 
statistically significant differences (p>0.05) in response time 
were observed among the displays. 
V. SUMMARY 
The overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes 
the pilot was evaluated so that operational and performance 
requirements can be determined. The relationship between 
specific display and algorithm features and the risk ratio of the 
combined pilot-DAA system was investigated. The first 
objective of this work was to study the effectiveness of the 
pilot–DAA system to remain well clear as a function of display 
and algorithms features. The second objective was to collect 
and analyze pilot performance parameters that will help 
improve DAA modeling in batch computer simulations. Over 
the course of two experiments, 21 professional UAS pilots 
evaluated eight different DAA systems. In the first experiment, 
the independent variables were the alerting times at which 
pilots needed to take action to remain well clear, the location of 
the traffic display (standalone vs. integrated), and the tools and 
informational elements available on the display. In the second 
experiment, new display types were examined, and the UAS 
encountered two categories of aircraft: those equipped with 
simulated ADS-B that could be displayed up to 80 nmi away 
and those without that were only detectable by a simulated 
radar (non-cooperative) within a range of six nautical miles.  
Total Response 
Time (sec) 
Pilot Acted Without ATC Clearance Pilot Obtained ATC Clearance 
Overall Coop. Non-coop. Overall Coop. Non-coop. 
Median 9 11 9 16 19 14 
Mean 10.8 13.4 9.8 18.7 24.7 15.9 
Std. Dev. 3.1 8.4 6.2 7.9 13.2 8.5 
N 85 23 62 87 27 60 
 
Figure 10: Mean response time by time to closest point of approach at 
which the first SS alert was provided classified by whether the pilot 
obtained an ATC clearance before maneuvering in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 1, pilots were almost never able to remain 
well clear when self-separation alerts were provided 15 
seconds or less prior to loss of well clear (i.e., less than 55 
seconds time-to-CPA). The “Advanced Integrated” display 
resulted in the least amount of time spent in a LoWC, which 
was the only statistically significant LoWC severity result. 
When maneuvering to prevent LoWCs, median response times 
were significantly shorter when the pilot did not obtain an 
amended clearance: 16 seconds without a clearance and 27 
seconds with a clearance. 
There were fewer LoWCs in Experiment 2, because the 
pilots relied exclusively on the integrated display from 
Experiment 1, which resulted in fewer LoWCs than the 
standalone displays. No display in Experiment 2 resulted in 
significantly fewer LoWCs than any other. When excluding 
“popup” LoWCs, pilots were able to prevent LoWCs in 76% of 
the encounters with non-cooperative aircraft when alerted 20 
seconds or less prior to losing well clear, and in 96% of the 
encounters with non-cooperative aircraft when alerted more 
than 20 seconds prior to losing well clear. For encounters with 
cooperative aircraft, the pilots were able to prevent LoWCs 
50% of the time when alerted 20 seconds or less prior to losing 
well clear, and 93% of the time when alerted with more than 20 
seconds. Pilot response times were shorter in Experiment 2 due 
to improved training and methodologies. The mean pilot 
response time for all encounters when pilots obtained an ATC 
clearance prior to maneuvering was 18.7 seconds, and it was 
10.8 seconds for encounters when pilots decided to maneuver 
without obtaining an ATC clearance.  
As safety case standards are still being developed, it is not 
yet known whether these specific DAA system designs will 
meet the airspace safety threshold. However, these results 
suggest that integrating DAA traffic information together with 
the pilot’s primary tactical situation display may reduce the 
proportion of LoWCs. Furthermore, data from this experiment 
will be used to build a more “representative” DAA system for 
non-human-in-the-loop simulations. 
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